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THE STRANGELY FAMILIAR HISTORY OF THE UNITARY
THEORY OF PERPETRATION
James G. Stewart*
forthcoming, Essays in Honor of Mirjan Damaška
ABSTRACT
A unitary theory of perpetration is one that does not espouse different
legal standards for different forms of participating in crime. In this
Article, I pay homage to Professor Damaška’s influence on my work and
career by reiterating my earlier arguments for a unitary theory of
perpetration in international criminal law. Whereas my earlier work
defended the unitary theory in abstract terms then for international
criminal law in particular, this Article looks to the history of the unitary
theory in five national systems that have abandoned differentiated systems
like that currently in force internationally in favor of a unitary variant.
Curiously, as things transpire, the reasons Norway, Denmark, Italy,
Austria and Brazil dispensed with the types of differentiated system
currently in force in international criminal law are strangely familiar to
those working in international criminal justice today. The eerie sense of
déjà vu that arises from reading these histories suggests that, potentially,
the unitary theory may have real potential as a way through many of the
key points of conceptual impasse that presently characterize this aspect of
the field. In this respect, the Article seeks to contribute an historical
perspective to a burgeoning dialogue about forms of blame attribution
internationally by again questioning whether the great struggle with
“modes of liability” is worth continuing.
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I. INTRODUCTION
International criminal courts and tribunals use the term “modes of
liability” to designate forms of participation in atrocity such as instigation,
aiding and abetting, joint criminal enterprise (“JCE”) and command
responsibility.1 In 2001, Mirjan Damaška authored a sublime critique of
one of these modes of liability in an article entitled The Shadow Side of
Command Responsibility.2 Intellectually, the article was somewhat
daunting for me as a then aspiring academic; it drew on a staggering
breadth of learning in the history of criminal law, the theory of criminal
responsibility and comparative law. Substantively, the article also planted
a seed for my own subsequent work—at one point in this wonderful piece,
Damaška argued that to the extent command responsibility was not
objectionable, it merely collapsed into garden-variety omission liability.3
This argument sparked my own thinking about the extent to which forms
of liability as a species could be folded into a single unified set of
normative principles. Why stop at just command responsibly? Several
years later, this intuition led me to the unitary theory of perpetration that I
revisit here. Stylistically, Damaška’s exceptionally eloquent prose
awakened a realization that legal scholarship could be warmly critical,
involve a spirited commitment to justice, draw heavily on the imagination
and act as a vehicle for one’s own attempt at aesthetic excellence. I hope
that my very inferior attempt at emulation here reveals something of his
influence.
At present, “modes of liability” are numerous in international
criminal law (“ICL”), ranging from traditional notions of instigation and
aiding and abetting to more exotic concepts like Joint Criminal Enterprise
(“JCE”) as well as the object of Damaška’s original critique, command
responsibility. To my mind, the difficulties Damaška so eloquently
pointed to in his earlier work encompass most species in the genus.
Viewed as an ensemble, modes of liability appear to be sometimes harsh,
1

As I have pointed out in earlier work, the phrase “modes of liability” is slightly
conceptually misleading and of uncertain historical pedigree. See James G. Stewart, The
End of “Modes of Liability” for International Crimes, 25 LEIDEN. J. INT’L. L. 165–219,
166 (2012).
2
Mirjan Damas̆ ka, The Shadow Side of Command Responsibility, 49 AM. J. COMP. L.
455–496 (2001).
3
Id. at 462. (“When superiors are aware of the impending delinquency of their
subordinates and do nothing to stop them, their omission shades into conventional
complicity - aiding by omission - and has therefore hardly any independent purchase.”).
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occasionally too lenient, frequently very difficult to understand, the source
of important inefficiency, and as a combined consequence of all the
foregoing, in a state of seemingly continuous flux. In what follows, I
reiterate my suggestion that “modes of liability” should be abandoned in
ICL, arguing again for a single functional unitary theory of perpetration
wherever international crimes are invoked.4 On this theory, whenever an
international crime is charged in any forum, national or international, a
causal contribution combined with the mental element(s) required by the
crime charged would be necessary and sufficient to establish participation
in the international crime.5
As things transpire, my project is not new. In 1902, the world’s
leading criminal law theorists formally endorsed the unitary theory of
perpetration at a distinguished congress of the Union International de
Droit Pénal (“UIDP”) in St Petersburg, precisely because it promised to
overcome many of the same sorts of problems that modern ICL now
struggles with.6 The UIDP, or Internationalen kriminalistischen
Vereinigung (“IKV”) as it was also known, represented the who’s-who of
world criminal law theorists, at a time when passion for criminal science
was arguably at its zenith. As a consequence of its then intellectual
prestige, the UIDP’s endorsement of the unitary theory had a marked
impact in practice—at least five countries abolished the differentiated
system previously in force within their jurisdictions in favor of the unitary
theory on the strength of this intellectual leadership. For reasons I come to
4

My previous article, entitled The End of ‘Modes of Liability’ for International Crimes,
argued that a unitary theory of perpetration follows from the criticisms of individual
“modes of liability” of international criminal law, accounts for conceptual shortcomings
of complicity in ICL, is theoretically defensible, and offers a set of pragmatic advantages
in ICL in particular. See Stewart, supra note 2. I did not commit to a pure, functional, or
sentence-based variant of the unitary theory in this earlier work. On this distinction, see
James G. Stewart, Complicity, in OXFORD CRIMINAL LAW HANDBOOK (Markus Dubber
& Tatjana Hörnle eds., 2014). Upon reflection, I am minded to think that a functional
unitary theory is preferable to a pure system, since this functional variant announces the
various forms of causation, like instigating and aiding for example, while still employing
stable substantive elements for all forms of participation. I am grateful to Kai Ambos for
suggesting that I clarify this point.
5
For a conceptual overview of different theories of complicity from a comparative
perspective, including three variations of the unitary theory, see James G. Stewart,
Complicity, in OXFORD CRIMINAL LAW HANDBOOK (Markus Dubber & Tatjana Hörnle
eds., 2014).
6
Bulletin de l’Union Internationale de Droit Pénal 137 (1904) (“Quant à la question de
la complicité, la loi devra abandoner toute distinction doctrinaire entre ceux qui on
participé au meme crime et se borner à indiquer les modes de participation qu’elle
considérera comme tells”). Abandoning formal distinctions between participants but still
announcing forms of participations as a guide to the public makes this theory a functional
unitary theory. I also think that a functional unitary theory would be preferable in ICL.

2016]

5

momentarily, five is a far greater number than it seems at first blush. In
this article, I argue that ICL should imitate this shift, not just within
international courts, but also in national systems when international crimes
are charged.
Ironically, the UIDP also shared this universalizing ambition—
according to Professor Franz von Liszt, one of the group’s intellectual
forefathers, the significant advance in criminal science that produced the
unitary theory of perpetration should feature as a central part of “the
unification of criminal codes,” and the “universalization of criminal law.”7
In this Article, I take von Liszt’s project seriously, at least for trials
involving international crimes. At least one leading modern scholar also
shares these sentiments. Referring to the “universal structure of criminal
law” as an “antidote” to the sorts of positivist arguments that reify
domestic criminal doctrine, George Fletcher writes that “resolutions on the
surface of the law should not obscure the unity that underlies apparently
diverse legal cultures.”8 Consequently, “the task of theorists in the current
century is to elaborate the general principles of criminal law that should be
recognized not only in the International Criminal Court, but in all civilized
nations.”9
Instead of revisiting my earlier work defending the unitary theory in
abstract terms,10 this article interrogates why the UIDP then various
national legal systems abandoned differentiated forms of blame attribution
in favor of the unitary theory. As things transpire, the problems that led
these national systems to a volte-face on the topic of blame attribution are
strikingly similar to those the ICL is currently wrestling with.
Consequently, the histories that follow should act as a caution against a
faith that judge-made law will ultimately produce a settled defensible
consensus about forms of attribution in ICL or, in other words, that a
dogmatik will eventually emerge with time. In a number of the national
systems I discuss below this never came to pass, to the point that leading
criminal law theorists of the day ultimately advocated for transcending the
7

LEON RADZINOWICZ, THE ROOTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF CRIMINAL
LAW AND THEIR SIGNIFICANCE: A TRIBUTE AND A RE-ASSESSMENT ON THE CENTENARY
OF THE IKV 24 (1991).
8
GEORGE FLETCHER, BASIC CONCEPTS OF CRIMINAL LAW 5 (1998).
9
GEORGE FLETCHER, THE GRAMMAR OF CRIMINAL LAW 20 (2007).
10
For a discussion linked to international criminal law particular, see Stewart, supra note
2. More generally, see THOMAS ROTSCH, “EINHEITSTÄTERSCHAFT” STATT
TATHERRSCHAFT:
ZUR
ABKEHR
VON
EINEM
DIFFERENZIERENDEN
BETEILIGUNGSFORMENSYSTEM IN EINER NORMATIV-FUNKTIONALEN STRAFTATLEHRE (1.
Auflage. ed. 2009); Johannes Keiler, Towards a European Concept of Participation in
Crime, in SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, 157 – 317 (André
Klip ed., 2011).
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very structure that subsumed the doctrine. I again suggest that ICL should
consider following this alternative route.
I divide the article into five separate parts, each of which singles out
a particular rationale for each of the five different states cited for departing
from the differentiated system of blame attribution in favor of a unitary
alternative. The historical narrative proceeds in chronological order,
starting with the initial promulgation of a unitary theory of perpetration in
Norway and culminating with the Austrian law adopted most recently.
Although I have isolated one rationale for the unitary theory per country, I
do not mean to imply that these were the only motivations for the
normative shift in each context; there were actually a large number of
reasons for abandoning the differentiated system of blame attribution in
each jurisdiction. Nevertheless, by highlighting five states’ rationales for
the juridical change and mapping these rationales onto protracted debates
about blame attribution in modern ICL, I hope to shed new light on the
ways in which contemporary struggles on the topic at the international
level are contingent on the differentiated structure. In each of the national
systems I review, scholars were grappling with the very same problems
that haunt modern ICL now, before they reached for a transcendent
solution.
Several disclaimers are necessary at the outset. In what follows, I
traverse an unreasonably wide terrain. I have not visited any archive in
compiling these histories and my materials are, for the most part, from
secondary sources. I have also had to engage the research assistance of
native language speakers in each of the countries I write about, so the
likelihood that I have misunderstood or distorted original theorists in
certain instances is unavoidably high. In addition, I have not highlighted
differences between pure, functional and sentence-based unitary systems
in the various jurisdictions I discuss,11 thereby failing to illuminate the
sometimes marked discrepancies between them.12 Similarly, my project is
11

I have explained the differences between these three variants of the unitary theory
elsewhere, questioning whether the sentence-based account is properly classified as
unitary at all. For an overview, see Stewart, supra note 5, at 539-540.
12
Art. 12, Austrian Criminal Code adopts a functional unitary theory by announcing
different forms of participation like perpetrators, instigators and accomplices, but it
maintains uniform substantive elements for these various forms, thus justifying its
inclusion within the unitary theory family. See JEAN PRADEL, DROIT PÉNAL COMPARÉ
194 (2e ed. 2002). Norway, on the other hand, has no provision governing substantive
rules of participation at all, relegating these issues to the special part of the criminal code.
For discussion, see JOHANNES ANDENAES, THE GENERAL PART OF THE CRIMINAL LAW
OF NORWAY 274-277 (1965). Coincidently, this approach accords with Douglas Husak’s
conceptual preference for complicity. Douglas Husak, Abetting a Crime, 33 LAW AND
PHILOSOPHY 41–73 (2014). In Denmark, to offer one final variation, it appears that
causation is not required for any form of participation. See Jørn Vestergaard, Criminal
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entirely historical, which overlooks contemporary perceptions of the
unitary theory of perpetration’s function in these various systems. Several
friends, for instance, have pointed out that in at least one of my examples,
the enthusiasm for the unitary theory at the point of codification many
decades ago is almost certainly a thing of the past. Because my project is
mostly historical, I must defer to others on these questions.13 Finally, I
have not engaged with the thoughtful criticisms of the unitary theory of
perpetration that are beginning to emerge in ICL,14 hoping that my
opinionated argument below will make a further contribution to a lively
but respectful scholarly debate to be staged elsewhere. In this vein, I very
much hope that what follows instigates a range of in-country experts to
correct, critique and elaborate upon my brief accounts.
II. INTELLECTUAL DISSATISFACTION IN NORWAY
In 1828, the German Professor of criminal law, Christoph Karl
Stübel, wrote a highly influential book on criminal legislation.15 In it, he
explored the implications of then new thinking about causation for the
concept of complicity. According to the then newly popular theory of
counterfactual dependence (known as Äquivalenztheorie in the native
German), all conditions are considered causal that could not be left out of

Participation in Danish Law - Uniformity Unlimited? in CRIMINAL LAW THEORY IN
TRANSITION: FINISH AND COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 475–490 (Raimo Lahti & Kimmo
Nuotio eds., 1992). Here again, Anglo-American theorists would concur. Alexander,
Morse and Ferzan offer a conceptual defense of a normative scheme precisely like the
Danish--one that does not formally distinguish between various forms of participation
and removes causation for all aspects of the criminal law. See LARRY ALEXANDER,
KIMBERLY KESSLER FERZAN & STEPHEN J. MORSE, CRIME AND CULPABILITY: A THEORY
OF CRIMINAL LAW (2009).
13
For an extensive review of this sort, see BETTINA WEIßER, TÄTERSCHAFT IN EUROPA:
EIN DISKUSSIONSVORSCHLAG FÜR EIN EUROPÄISCHES TÄTERMODELL AUF DER BASIS
EINER
RECHTSVERGLEICHENDEN
UNTERSUCHUNG DER BETEILIGUNGSSYSTEME
DEUTSCHLANDS, ENGLANDS, FRANKREICHS, ITALIENS UND ÖSTERREICHS (1. Auflage. ed.
2011).
14
Gerhard Werle and Boris Burghardt, Establishing Degrees of Responsibility: Modes of
Participation in Article 25 of the ICC Statute, in PLURALISM IN INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL JUSTICE (Elies van Sliedregt and Boris Burghart eds.), pp. 301-319 (criticizing
my defense of the unitary theory of perpetration). See also, CASSANDRA STEER,
TRANSLATING GUILT: IDENTIFYING LEADERSHIP LIABILITY FOR MASS ATROCITY (T.M.C
Asser Press, 2015) (same).
15
CHRISTOPH CARL STÜBEL, UEBER DIE THEILNAHME MEHRERER PERSONEN AN EINEM
VERBRECHEN: EIN BEITRAG ZUR CRIMINALGESETZGEBUNG UND ZUR BERICHTIGUNG DER
IN DEN CRIMINALGERICHTEN GELTENDEN GRUNDSÄTZE (1828).
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consideration without the result not occurring.16 By implication, all
conditions are conceptually equivalent not temporally sequenced, meaning
that both the person who supplies the weapon and the murderer who uses
it make equal causal contributions to a consummated crime according to
the prevailing test, regardless of their contribution’s temporal distance
from it. Stübel was not the first to contemplate the equivalence of causal
contributions but he was original in one respect—he doubted whether
formal causal equality necessarily resulted in the same sentence for
perpetrators and accomplices.17 Thus, the journey to the unitary theory
began. If causation unified perpetrators and accomplices alike at the level
of attribution, any need for differentiated sentencing could be achieved
after responsibility for the consummated crime was attributed.
After Stübel, a number of other prominent European theorists
developed and refined the potentiality of a unitary theory,18 but it is highly
unlikely that their intellectual labors would have born fruit in practice
without the catalytic effect of the UIDP. Founded in 1888 by three
prominent European criminal law theorists,19 the UIDP or IKV as it also
described itself in its second working language, brought together the
leading scholars of the time. The professional association soon became
exceptionally popular internationally—by 1905 it boasted a membership
of one thousand two hundred participants from thirty countries.20
Although the organization served as a platform for discussions about a
range of topics, complicity was high on the group’s agenda for a number
of years: its members were preoccupied with “[t]he influence of the new
concepts in the field of criminal law on ways of defining…complicity.”21
Ultimately, this interest led them to abandon the doctrine as an
autonomous concept in line with the insights developed by Stübel and his
many successors. As I have argued elsewhere, I am of the opinion that
ICL should do similarly.

16

For discussion of Äquivalenztheorie, see Claus Roxin, Strafrecht Allgemeiner Teil, 4.
Aufl. (München: Beck, 2006), vol. 1, p. 352, § 11 Rn 7. For English-language
equivalents, see VOLKER KREY, GERMAN CRIMINAL LAW GENERAL PART 47–57 (2002)
(providing a helpful English language overview of causation in German criminal theory);
H. L. A. HART & TONY HONORÉ, CAUSATION IN THE LAW 431–464 (discussing dominant
German theories of causation) (2 ed. 1985).
17
ROTSCH, supra note 9, at 35.
18
Id. at 34–76. (discussing twenty-six other authors in the Germanophone tradition who
addressed the unitary theory of perpetration. This, of course, does not summarize the
contributions of others in various jurisdictions, especially Scandanavia and Austria).
19
The three included Franz von Liszt, its founder, Adolphe Prins and Gerard Anton van
Hamel.
20
RADZINOWICZ, supra note 6, at 2.
21
Id. at 11.
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Norway was the first to abandon a differentiated system of
attribution like that presently applicable in ICL in favor of the unitary
theory of perpetration. The Norwegians made this shift, in part, because
their leading academic minds viewed the unitary theory of perpetration as
conceptually superior. In 1875, for instance, the Norwegian Professor
Bernhard Getz published his thesis “Report on the So-Called Complicity
in Crimes,” in which he dismissed as invalid all distinctions between
parties to crimes, arguing that they should be subsumed within a more
extensive singular notion of perpetration.22 The core of his thesis, which
should have strong resonance for all familiar with the contemporary
connundra with forms of participation in modern ICL, was that “I am
aware of the line that legislation and theory draws between the perpetrator
on one side, and the accomplice on the other, but the line between the two
lacks a solid foundation.”23 In particular, Getz observed that:
“I don’t know how a perpetrator is unlike an accomplice and
hence I have entitled this paper ‘The So-Called Participation
in Crime.’ It seems to me that the accomplice fulfills all the
necessary requirements to be perceived as a perpetrator and
that every perception of the concept perpetration that
excludes the accomplice leads to unreasonable results, which
no one is willing to clarify.”24
Repeatedly referring to the concept of complicity in differentiated systems
as “amputated” from the body of blame attribution, Getz argued that the
sorts of debates about the separation of perpetration from complicity that
now captivate modern ICL arise from the fact that “this concept has been
torn out from its natural context.”25 Reintegration, therefore, was a more
conceptually attractive means of overcoming what was ultimately for
Getz, a false dilemma.
Getz raised a number of arguments to substantiate both his
intellectual dissatisfaction with the differentiated system and the
transcendent solution he preferred. With respect to the accomplice’s
objective contribution, he argued, drawing on the then groundbreaking
view of the equivalence of causes, that “[e]very action is objectively
speaking in the same relationship with the crime, every action leads to the
22

BERNHARD GETZ, OM DEN SAAKALDTE DELAGTIGHET I FORBRYDELSER: EN
STRAFFERETLIG UNDERSØKELSE 2 (Christiana, 1875). My kind thanks to Jon Erik
Lundgaard for his assistance with translations from the original Norwegian.
23
Id., at 2
24
Id.
25
Id.
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crime.”26 Consequently, “[o]ne must ask: Has the person contributed to
the crime or not? If he has, he is a perpetrator and consequently equally to
blame.” 27 In the subjective realm, Getz was earnest to point out how
motives are normally irrelevant to criminal liability, so appending
additional subjective elements in an attempt to differentiate perpetrators
from accomplices (i.e. did the actor view the crime as her own) was not
only a departure from normal thinking, it amounted to “an unconditional
mistake.”28 Concluding his study colorfully, Getz reaffirmed that “every
proposition to prove the specific distinction between the accomplice and
the perpetrator has flashed before our eyes and must be deemed
inadequate.”29
ICL’s plight to solve the riddle Getz found to be without convincing
solution has played out in various different ways. Initially, the ICC
seemed to treat the plurality of “modes of liability” in the ICC Statute as
axiomatic—as if it is made necessary by the very metaphysics of blame
attribution. For instance, the ICC’s first decision incorporating the
German notion of “control over the crime” as a criterion for delimiting
perpetration from complicity simply states that “the definitional criterion
of the concept of co-perpetration is linked to the distinguishing criterion
between principals and accessories to a crime where a criminal offence is
committed by a plurality of persons.”30 The Chamber did not indicate how
the Statute made the distinguishing criterion conceptually inevitable. In
fact, the use of the definite article to imply an inexorable division between
perpetration and complicity is at odds with the scholarly work of Bernhard
Getz and others, who had argued that this type of assumption was
conceptually invalid.31 Moreover, to assume the contrary is not only
insensitive to the theory Getz helped popularize, it is also slightly out of
step with the history of ICL.
Although the Nuremberg and Tokyo Charters explicitly enumerated
different forms of attribution,32 the Nuremberg Tribunal itself merely
26

Id., at 4.
Id.
28
Id., at 52.
29
Id., at 59.
30
Prosecutor v. Bemba, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08, Decision Pursuant to Article
61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute on the Charges of the Prosecutor Against JeanPierre Bemba Gombo, ¶ 326 (June 15, 2009) (emphasis added).
31
ROTSCH, supra note 9, at 17.
32
Art. 6(3) of the Nuremberg Charter reads: “Leaders, organizers, instigators and
accomplices participating in the formulation or execution of a common plan or
conspiracy to commit any of the foregoing crimes are responsible for all acts performed
by any persons in execution of such plan.” Agreement for the Prosecution and
Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis, 59 Stat. 1544, 82
U.N.T.S. 284, reprinted in 39 AM. J. INT’L L. 257 (Supp. 1945).
27
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considered whether an accused was “concerned in,” “connected with”,
“inculpated in” or “implicated in” international crimes.33 As many leading
commentators now accept, this approach entailed a unitary theory of
perpetration that was functionally equivalent to the concept the UIDP and
Getz had called for,34 namely, a system of blame attribution that declined
to disaggregate modes of participation into formal legal concepts like
aiding and abetting, superior responsibility or JCE, instead holding the
substantive elements of blame attribution constant across the various roles
different actors might play. Thus, the Nuremberg Tribunal dispensed with
“the distinguishing criterion” a majority at the ICC would later assume to
be structurally inescapable. Although the judges at Nuremberg made no
explicit reference to Getz or the unitary theory, their approach does point
to a similar intellectual dissatisfaction at some of the earliest stages of
modern ICL.
The same intellectual dissatisfaction is evident today, albeit among a
minority of prominent international judges. Like other aspects of ICL, the
differentiated system of blame attribution and the difficult normative
dilemmas that accompany it are “haunted by the presence of dissenting
counter-narratives.”35 ICC Judge van den Wyngaert, for instance, has
argued that “[v]ery often the acts and conduct of political and military
leaders will simply not fit the mould of principal liability. To try to
characterise them as principals at any cost will thus often be problematic
from a legal and conceptual point of view. However, once the rigid
division between [perpetration and complicity] is abandoned, there is no
33

For an overview of these cases, see THE UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMMISSION,
DIGEST OF THE LAWS AND CASES, LAW REPORTS OF THE TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS,
VOL. XV, 49–58 (1947).
34
KAI AMBOS, TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: VOLUME 1: FOUNDATIONS
AND GENERAL PART 105 (2013) (“the IMT and IMTFE Statutes merely require a causal
contribution to a certain criminal result, thereby opting for a unitarian concept of
perpetration (Einheitstäterschaft). As will be seen below, the jurisprudence adopted this
fairly unsophisticated approach.”); OLÁSOLO ET AL., THE CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY OF
SENIOR POLITICAL AND MILITARY LEADERS AS PRINCIPALS TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMES
21 (2010) (“the IMT and IMTFE embraced a unitary model which did not distinguish
between the perpetration of a crime... and participation in a crime committed by a third
person”); and ALBIN ESER, INDIVIDUAL CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY 781 (2002) (“for
supranational courts and codes, this somehow `holistic’ model of perpetratorship [the
unitary theory of perpetration] seemed attractive enough to be followed by the
Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals”).
35
GERRY SIMPSON, LAW, WAR AND CRIME : WAR CRIMES TRIALS AND THE REINVENTION
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 92 (2007). Simpson eloquently points out the “discordant notes”
dissenting judges have often sounded in the history of ICL. To use his metaphor, these
dissents on forms of attribution are discordant with respect to the majority of academic
opinion on the topic by they turn out to be harmonic with Bernhard Getz’s unitary theory
of perpetration.
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reason to qualify them as principals in order to attribute the level of blame
which they deserve.”36 Similarly, ICC Judge Fulford has argued against
“the perceived necessity to establish a clear dividing line between the
various forms of liability… to distinguish between the liability of
‘accessories’… and that of ‘principals.’”37 Admittedly, Getz took these
sorts of ideas a step further by advocating for substantive consistency in
standards of attribution, to the point that the importance of differentiating
between them disintegrated. Still, the harmony between aspects of his
theory and these dissenting opinions is an important part of what makes
the history of the unitary theory so eerie now.
The familiarly of the unitary theory’s history for modern ICL also
plays out in theory, where recent scholarship by leading theorists proves
that intellectual history can also repeat. In a recent set of articles, for
instance, one of the leading contemporary theorists of criminal law in the
English-speaking world, Michael Moore, has surmised that complicity is
conceptually “superfluous.”38 He argues that “there is no unique desert
basis for accomplice liability. Aiding another to cause some bad result is
not an independent desert basis. It is a mere stand-in for one of the four
general bases on which we are rightly blamed.”39 Like the judges at
Nuremberg and the ICC, this argumentation does not draw on the UIDP,
Getz or the unitary tradition they helped initiate, but the underlying
intellectual dissatisfaction with the autonomous concept of complicity
mirrors Getz’s discontent a century prior, in ways that create a strange
sense of déjà vu. Some of Moore’s language is even reminiscent of
Getz—in concluding his brilliant study of the same topic more than a
hundred years later, Moore opined that “[w]hat we have seen should be
sufficient to sink the good ship Complicity, not rearrange its
furnishings.”40
In Norway, this sinking came about at the behest of Getz himself
together with the scholarly imprimatur of the UIDP. Professor Getz was a
prominent member of the association, which helped the dissemination of
36

See Ngudjolo Trial Judgement, Case no.: ICC-01/04-02/12, Concurring Opinion of
Judge Christine Van den Wyngaert, (Dec. 18, 2012) ¶ 29.
37
Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No.: ICC-01/04-01/06 Judgement pursuant
to Article 74 of the Statute, (Mar. 14, 2012), Separate Opinion of Judge Adrian Fulford,
¶ 6.
38
Michael S Moore, Causing, Aiding, and the Superfluity of Accomplice Liability, 156 U.
PA. L. REV. 395 (2007); See also Michael S. Moore, The Superfluity of Accomplice
Liability, in CAUSATION AND RESPONSIBILITY: AN ESSAY IN LAW, MORALS, AND
METAPHYSICS 280–323 (2009); MICHAEL S. MOORE, CAUSATION AND RESPONSIBILITY:
AN ESSAY IN LAW, MORALS, AND METAPHYSICS (2009).
39
Causing, Aiding, and the Superfluity of Accomplice Liability, supra n 38, at 395.
40
Moore, Causing, Aiding, and the Superfluity of Accomplice Liability, supra note 36, at
449.
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this thesis. His work quickly caught the attention of prominent criminal
theorists, in an age when the law professor was the “hero figure” of legal
globalization.41 Unsurprisingly, this influence increased by some order of
magnitude after he was asked to draft the Norwegian criminal code.
According to one modern Norwegian scholar, Getz’s Code “won
international recognition and, in its time, was considered the most modern
penal code in Europe.”42 Of course, its treatment of complicity surprised
no one—the Norwegian Code of 1902 contained a pure unitary theory of
perpetration, which remains in force to this day.43 So in sharp
contradistinction to the origins of global criminal doctrine I address in the
context of Brazil below, the unitary theory was developed initially from
conceptual first principles that still resonate with ICL judges and theorists
today, then it was adopted by a selection of national legal systems like
Norway with some important degree of “indigeneity.”44 Certainly, there is
still a great deal to be said for and against the unitary theory in ICL, but it
is noteworthy how intellectual dissatisfaction was a key motivating factor
in Norway’s turn away from a differentiated system, and how that
dissatisfaction lives on in ICL today.
III. UNDUE PRACTICAL DIFFICULTIES IN DENMARK
As was the case in Norway before its shift to a unitary system (and
in ICL presently), the Danish Criminal Code of 1866 embraced a
differentiated system of criminal responsibility. But following in
Norway’s steed, Denmark parted ways with the differentiated model once
presented with the perceived advance in criminal science the unitary
theory entailed. To this day, “[i]n Danish literature on criminal law, the
[unitary theory of perpetration] is considered to be by far superior to other
legal models.”45 In the Danish history, a leading Professor of Criminal
Law named Carl Torp emerged as the chief protagonist for this doctrinal
41

Duncan Kennedy, Two Globalizations of Law & Legal Thought: 1850-1968, 36
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 631, 638 (2002) (“The hero figure of the first globalization was the
law professor (author of codes and statutory modifications of codes, as well as of
treaties)”).
42
ANDENAES, supra note 11, at 20.
43
Id. at 277. (“Whether the defendant is guilty as a principal or a cooperator is merely a
factor to be considered in meting out punishment, and there is no judicial interest in
drawing a sharp line between the two.”).
44
I borrow the term from Schauer, who points to a frequent desire for reactionary law
reform after periods of foreign dominance to create a “transformed republic... whose
chief characteristic is its ‘indigeneity.’” FREDERICK F. SCHAUER, THE POLITICS AND
INCENTIVES OF LEGAL TRANSPLANTATION (2000).
45
Vestergaard, supra note 11, at 489.
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realignment, although by that time, the impetus of the UIDP’s
endorsement in 1902 and the Norwegian example led by Getz
undoubtedly reduced the intellectual leadership required of him. While
Torp rehearsed a familiar set of conceptual arguments against the
differentiated system in advocating for its dismantling in Denmark,46 he
also seized upon a range of practical observations about difficulties with
its operation. In one instance, for example, he argued:
“Presumably it is now recognized from all sides, that the
current Criminal Code in relation to an accessory in a crime
sets out a series of rather artificial and mutual artificial
delimiting Concepts that only moderately correspond to life’s
natural Conditions and cause unnecessary difficulties in
applying the law.”47
Based on some years experience at the coalface, I am of the opinion that a
wide variety of “modes of liability” in ICL have also become artificial,
only moderately correspond to real life, and are unnecessary difficult to
apply. To illustrate, I here focus on just one mode of liability, indirect coperpetration, which appears to exemplify all three of the shortcomings
Torp observed of the differentiated model operative in Denmark at the
time.
Indirect co-perpetration has emerged as the next major trend in
ICL’s experimentation with standards of blame attribution.48 The concept
46

CARL TORP, DEN DANSKE STRAFFERETS ALMINDELIGE DEL (1905) (“Presumably the
participant’s Act may be just as necessary a preliminary Condition as the perpetrator’s
crime offence … It all must come to the recognition that every preliminary Condition in
relation to a specific Circumstance is equally necessary and therefore in theory of equal
Importance, so that it is impossible to single out one or more Conditions as relevant in
contrast to the remaining Conditions.”) I am grateful to Anja Amdi Harild for the
translation.
47
Betænkning afgiven af Straffelovskommissionen af 9. November 1917 (“Report from
the Penal Code Commission of November 9, 1917”) In the explanatory notes to the draft
Offence Code, the Commission states “it cannot be recognized that there is a sharp
essential difference between Perpetrators and Accessories”. See Danish Criminal Code
Report of 1923, Explanatory Statements to the Draft Criminal Code, column 73.
48
Strikingly, indirect co-perpetration is charged in most cases before the ICC presently,
confirming that it represents the next trend in international blame attributions. The
following is a non-exhaustive sample of cases involving indirect co-perpetration at the
ICC. Prosecutor v. Bemba, Case No.: ICC-01/05-01/08-15, Warrant of Arrest, (Jun. 10,
2008), ¶ 21; Prosecutor v. Katanga and Chui, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges,
ICC-01/04-01/07-717, 30 September 2008, ¶ 492 [hereafter “Katanga Confirmation
Decision”]; Prosecutor v. Al Bashir, Warrant of Arrest, ICC-02/05-01/09-1, 4 March
2009, at 7; Prosecutor v. Kenyatta et al., Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, Case
No.: ICC-01/09-02/11-382-Red, (Jan. 23, 2012), ¶ 300 [hereafter “Kenyatta
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is an amalgam of two distinct “modes of liability.” The co-perpetration
element, initially rejected at ad hoc tribunals, was recently included within
the ICC Statute as a species of perpetration. The second component,
indirect perpetration, is analogous to the Anglo-American concept of
innocent agency, whereby an individual becomes responsible for a
criminal offense by employing an innocent actor (such as a child) as an
instrument through which he brings about the crime. By fudging the fact
that African foot soldiers are not actually innocent agents, then marrying
this slightly fictitious rendering of indirect perpetration to co-perpetration,
the ICC has adopted a notion of “diagonal responsibility” to hold one
African warlord responsible as a perpetrator for the crimes committed by
rank and file soldiers in a separate armed group the warlord co-operated
with. In my opinion, this approach dovetails with all of Torp’s practical
criticisms of the differentiated system that was once in place within
Denmark.
First, indirect co-perpetration is highly artificial. For some of the
modern advocates of the unitary theory of participation, the very moment
differentialists dilute indirect perpetration (a.k.a “innocent” agency) to the
point where the actual foot-soldier doing the bloodletting need no longer
be innocent, they do irreparable harm to their entire analytical scheme. As
Thomas Rotsch has argued, once there is a fully responsible principal
perpetrator (i.e. a foot-soldier who enjoys full moral capacity), there
should be no leeway for applying the doctrine of indirect perpetratorship
to the soldier’s superior if differentiation is to be taken seriously.49 The
very idea of a “perpetrator behind a perpetrator” demonstrates inductive
reasoning in defiance of the rationale for ex ante differentiation in the first
place. Once this idea is entertained, intuitions about culpability and
sentencing are generating exceptional concepts that run counter to

Confirmation Decision”]; Prosecutor v Ruto et al, Case No.: ICC-01/09-01/11, Decision
on the Confirmation of Charges Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute
(Jan. 23, 2012), ¶¶ 290-292 [hereafter “Ruto Confirmation Decision”]; Prosecutor v
Bosco Ntaganda, Case No.: ICC-01/04-02/06, Decision Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and
(b) of the Rome Statute on the Charges of the Prosecutor Against Bosco Ntaganda, (Jun.
8, 2014), ¶ 97 [hereafter “Ntaganda Confirmation Decision”]; Prosecutor v Laurent
Gbagbo, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges Against Laurent Gbagbo, Case
No.:ICC-02/11-01/11, (Jun. 12, 2014), ¶ 226 [hereafter “Laurent Gbagbo Confirmation
Decision”] Part of my enthusiasm for the unitary theory of perpetration derives from my
skepticism about the way in which modes of attribution seem to move in fads
internationally, from superior responsibility, to JCE, and now to indirect co-perpetration
and its various component parts. It is peculiar that blame attribution moves in fads
internationally.
49
ROTSCH, supra note 9, at 461–462.
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foundational assumptions about differentiation.50 If differentiation has to
rely on a fiction to prop itself up, perhaps the concept should fall?
Second, indirect co-perpetration also vindicates Torp’s concern that
differentiated systems like that operative in modern ICL “only moderately
correspond to real life.” As I have pointed out elsewhere,51 the risk in
making a concept as complex as indirect co-perpetration a mainstay of
blame attribution in ICL is that the meaning of increasingly abstract legal
terms seems esoteric to defendants, victims and ordinary citizens, who no
longer understand the terminology or its moral import.52 To illustrate,
when the ICC indicted former President Laurent Gbagbo as an indirect coperpetrator, the BBC placed the mode of participation in parentheses to
mark the technocratic legalese it had no expectation its readers would
understand.53 Contrariwise, if Gbagbo is responsible for the international
crimes he is reproached for, it seems infinitely more likely that his making
a substantial causal contribution to the crimes together with the necessary
blameworthy moral choice will better “correspond to real life,” in ways
that Torp foresaw. Moreover, discarding the label “indirect coperpetration” could minimize the distancing effect of culturally-specific
legal terminology.
Third, Torp’s misgiving that differentiated systems “cause
unnecessary difficulties in applying the law” also seems apparent from the
short history of indirect co-perpetration in ICL. In the interests of brevity,
I here summarize a set of milestones in that history that, in my opinion,
reveal precisely the type of over-complication I imagine Torp had in mind.
The ICC has insisted that the combination of co-perpetration and indirect
perpetration “allows the Court to assess the blameworthiness of ‘senior
leaders’ adequately.”54 However, at least one judge has objected that by

50

Id. at 461–462. Rotsch’s broader point is that as a result of these dynamics, different
forms of participation do not adequately mirror distinct degrees of culpability, traditional
doctrines on modes of participation are manipulated in order to achieve fair outcomes,
and ultimately, distinguishing between different modes of participation is already
unnecessary.
51
Stewart, supra note 2, at 212.
52
Id. at 212.
53
John James, Ivory Coast: Gbagbo faces murder and rape charges, 30 November 2011,
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-15960254 (“Former Ivory Coast President
Laurent Gbagbo is facing four charges of crimes against humanity, the International
Criminal Court (ICC) has said. He is accused of being an ‘indirect co-perpetrator’ of
murder, rape, persecution and other inhuman acts.”)
54
Prosecutor v Germain Katanga et al, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, Case
No.: ICC-01/04-01/07-717, (Sept. 30, 2008), ¶ 492.
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this method, the Court has invented a “totally new mode of liability.”55
The unitary theory of perpetration that so inspired Torp and his diverse
contemporaries within the UIDP would not allow for even the suggestion
of totally new modes of liability like this since the unitary theory is, by
definition, singular. Similarly, the ICC has adopted Claus Roxin’s theory
of organizational perpetration as a part of the co-perpetration component
of indirect co-perpetration,56 even though one leading German theorist
feared that this “may create more problems than it solves.”57 Then, after
the initial appearance of indirect co-perpetration at the ICC, subsequent
Chambers added another complicated mental element,58 before having to
determine whether dolus eventualis was a sufficient basis for establishing
indirect co-perpetration.59 Presently, depending on which interpretation
one follows, the test for indirect co-perpetration involves five objective
elements and four subjective, all of which are linguistically complex.60
55

Prosecutor v Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Judgment Pursuant to article 74 of the Statute,
Case No.: ICC-01/04-02/12, (Dec 18, 2012), Concurring Opinion of Judge Van den
Wyngaert, ICC-01/04-02/12-4, ¶ ¶ 60-61.
56
See Katanga Confirmation Decision, supra note 48, ¶ 498; Ruto Confirmation
Decision, supra note 48, ¶ 313; Ntaganda Confirmation Decision, supra note 48, ¶ 104.
Laurent Gbagbo Confirmation Decision, supra note 48, ¶ 234.
57
Thomas Weigend, Perpetration Through an Organization: The Unexpected Career of
a German Legal Concept, 9 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 91, 105 (2011) (“Since criminal liability
for ordering or instigation is a sufficient basis for imposing severe sentences on
responsible figures in the background of the actual crimes, adopting the notion of
‘perpetration through an organization’ may create more problems than it solves.”). I am
inclined to extend this reasoning to all modes of liability, but even if there is a principled
basis for denying the criticism that reach, it is still telling that a figure of Weigend’s
authority would question the merit of employing a German concept whose use is so
widespread at the ICC now.
58
Although the Lubanga Confirmation of Charges Decision had not required this
element, the Katanga Confirmation of Charges Decision added that “the suspects must be
aware of the character of their organisations, their authority within the organisation and
the factual circumstances enabling near-automatic compliance with their orders.”
Compare Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Decision on the Confirmation of
Charges, Case No.: ICC-01/04-01/06 (Jan. 29, 2007), ¶ 326 [hereafter “Lubanga
Confirmation Decision”] with Katanga Confirmation Decision, supra note 48, ¶ 534.
59
In the Katanga and Kenyatta Confirmation Decisions, Pre-Trial Chambers I and II
made no mention of whether dolus eventualis would suffice for indirect co-perpetration.
Subsequently, Pre-Trial Chamber III explicitly excluded it in the Bemba and Ruto
Confirmation Decisions. Compare Katanga Confirmation Decision, supra note 48, ¶ 531
and Kenyatta Confirmation Decision, supra note 48, ¶ 410 with Ruto Confirmation of
Charges Decision, supra note 48, ¶ 333-336
60
For an excellent summary of this and other ICC case law on forms of participation, see
WOMEN’S INITIATIVES FOR GENDER JUSTICE, MODES OF LIABILITY: A REVIEW OF THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT’S CURRENT JURISPRUDENCE AND PRACTICE 60–61
(2013), http://iccwomen.org/documents/Modes-of-Liability.pdf (setting out the elements
of indirect-perpetration across two pages).
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Most significantly, I suspect that Torp would find all these difficulties to
be of no conceptual importance,61 and therefore categorize them as
“unnecessary.”
There is much for ICL to learn from this very brief history. After
almost two decades of negotiations Torp led in Denmark, the Danish
parliament adopted a unitary theory of perpetration. Like Getz, Torp was
also the author of the criminal code that contained the system of blame
attribution he saw as preferable in a national context that did not have to
synthesize multiple legal traditions from throughout the world. So by a
process that was not entirely original but still infinitely freer than that
which brought about differentiated systems of blame attribution in most
systems of criminal justice (see Brazil below), the Danish adopted a
unitary theory of perpetration with the backing of global criminal law
theorists and the good example of a Nordic cousin. Moreover, despite the
power and influence of the largest European states that adopt a different
system, and the rise of international criminal justice that defers to these
powerful systems, Denmark has stuck with a unitary theory of
perpetration to this day.62 Strikingly, the practical reasons for its shift to
the unitary theory are now mirrored internationally, except that the need
for coherence is far greater for a global brand of criminal attribution.
IV. A MULTIPLICITY OF COMPETING SOLUTIONS IN ITALY
Italy adopted a variant of the unitary theory of perpetration in 1930,
in a process that again saw the UIDP and leading local scholars (as
distinct from colonializing masters, market pressures or reactionary
assertions of autonomy) play a leading role. In 1889, the Criminal Code of
the Kingdom of Italy, known as the Zanardelli Code after its author,
formally propagated a differentiated model of attribution replete with the
usual catalogue of “modes of liability.” In 1919, however, an influential
member of the Italian positivist school of criminology named Enrico Ferri
was chosen as President of the Criminal Reform Commission, which
61

In this respect, while I view Shachar Eldar’s excellent article on indirect coperpetration as the most sophisticated conceptual account of the topic I have read, the
very thoughtful piece does not articulate why a substantial causal contribution plus the
mental element of the crime charged should not suffice for indirect perpetration, in which
case we could dispense with this complicated architecture. Conversely, if these two
elements are not sufficient, the question may become whether indirect co-perpetration is
in danger of illiberal excess. See Shachar Eldar, Indirect Co-Perpetration, 8 CRIMINAL
LAW AND PHILOSOPHY 605–617 (2014).
62
Vestergaard, supra note 12 (discussing the parameters and merits of the unitary theory
in modern Danish law).
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began a process of rationalizing these forms of participation. It was not
until the then Minister of Justice, Alfredo Rocco, tabled his “Report on the
Final Draft of the 1930 Code,”63 however, that this process of
rationalization reached its apogee—Italians abandoned modes of
participation in favor of a unitary theory of perpetration like that endorsed
by the UIDP. Once again, aspects of this history reveal points of strange
commonality with modern ICL.
Besides the conceptual motivations others had voiced, the Italians
also saw real practical advantages in this new rationalization of diverse
standards of blame attribution, reasoning that a unitary theory would
provide a definitive solution to the multiplicity of competing theories
about the distinction between perpetration and complicity, which never
congealed into a stable shared understanding. In this respect, the important
point, which dovetails with the experience of international courts and
tribunals since their modern revival, is that the shift to a unitary theory
became important in Italy when attempts at distinguishing perpetrators
from accomplices created enormous legal uncertainty. Numerous creative
solutions proliferated without ever proving terribly convincing.64 As
Sergio Seminara shows, at the time the old Zanardelli Code was in force
in Italy, there were a wide range of doctrine on offer claiming to separate
perpetrators from accessories, but none were able to point to convincing
criteria, such that the problem remained without stable solution from start
to finish.65 In the words of Alfredo Rocco himself, “it is precisely for
practical needs that doctrine and law have struggled to find a secure
criteria to distinguish, in case of participation in a crime, principals from
accessories.”66
This history is somewhat sobering. If international criminal lawyers
assume that a consistent international dogmatik will inevitably emerge
from the ashes of numerous failed experiments, in some instances, history
suggests otherwise.
Already, attempts to differentiate perpetration from complicity in
ICL are displaying many of the qualities that led Italians to walk away
from the entire project. The Italian concern that no satisfying point of
differentiation ever emerged in Italy despite no shortage of competing
63

Alfredo Rocco, Progetto definitivo di un nuovo codice penale con la relazione del
Guardasigilli On. Parte I. Relazione sul Libro I del Progetto, LAVORI PREPARATORI DEL
CODICE PENALE E DEL CODICE DI PROCEDURA PENALE, Vol. V, 165 (1929).
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SERGIO SEMINARA, TECHNICHE NORMATIVE E CONCORSO DI PERSONE NEL REATO 31–
42 (1987) (listing a number of doctrines which, at the time the old Zanadelli Code was in
force, were not able to point out straight criteria for distinguishing between principals
and accessories.).
65
Id. at 31–42.
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Rocco, supra note 63, at 166.
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theories has proved prescient for ICL now. Famously, the ICC’s adoption
of “control over the crime” to do this work met with powerful dissenting
opinions by two prominent judges, both of whom disputed the need for the
test at all.67 Likewise, in the academy, the very best scholars have disputed
objective, subjective and mixed theories of differentiation with great
insight and rigor but without discernible agreement between them,68 in
ways their Italian predecessors experienced and would probably have
anticipated in ICL anew. In fact, some of the very best scholars have
ultimately concluded that “it is highly questionable whether [the ICC rules
governing blame attribution are] based on a single coherent, normative
theory of participation.”69 The Italians, on the other hand, did embrace a
single coherent, normative theory that stands to transcend the difficulties
ICL is (also) now negotiating. Again, the similarities with ICL’s present
are eerie.
Instead of retracing the various theories proffered to differentiate
perpetration from complicity, I pause to offer a qualified defense of the
Rocco Code in which the Italian rendition of the unitary theory first
appeared. Some will object that this code is an example of illiberal
criminal law in the service of totalitarianism. Rocco was a self-proclaimed
fascist, who unashamedly described the legislation he crafted for
Mussolini’s autocratic regime as “a political code.”70 Consequently, much
of the comparative literature still describes the Rocco Code as “the Fascist
Code.”71 As a result of this unholy historical association, the unitary
theory of perpetration is often unfairly dismissed out of hand—one
67

See statements by ICC Judges Van den Wyngaert and Fulford supra notes 36 and 37.
For a set of excellent but contrasting perspectives on the dividing line between
perpetration and complicity, see Neha Jain, The Control Theory of Perpetration in
International Criminal Law, 12 CHI. J. INT’L L. 159–200 (2011); Jens David Ohlin, Elies
Van Sliedregt & Thomas Weigend, Assessing the Control-Theory, 26 LEIDEN J. INT’L L.
725–746 (2013); Jens David Ohlin, Searching for the Hinterman In Praise of Subjective
Theories of Imputation, 12 J INT CRIMINAL JUSTICE 325–343 (2014); Carl-Friedrich
Stuckenberg, Problems of “Subjective Imputation” in Domestic and International
Criminal Law, 12 J INT CRIMINAL JUSTICE 311–323 (2014); Alicia Gil Gil & Elena
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Argentine theorist argues that “due to the connection between the unitary
theory and these ideas [Fascism and Nazism] today nobody argues
them.”72 That reasoning, however, is likely a non sequitur, deploying a
kind of guilt by association to discredit a concept that does not deserve the
reputational sleight.
In truth, the Rocco Code was not all bad—it also ushered in a range of
liberal changes,73 then survived several decades of reform by multiple
democratic governments in Italy that were “avowedly anti-fascist.”74 This,
at the same time that certain provisions, especially that governing
perpetration, were voluntarily “transplanted” into adjacent criminal
systems, most notably in Brazil (see below).75 From a wider vantage point,
too, the almost invariable irony of episodes of mass violence is that they
can also contain isolated pockets of liberal development. Some of the most
important “discoveries” in German criminal science, for instance, were
first unearthed and applied during the Nazi reign of terror.76 Thus, as a
general rule, pointing to the fascist origins of the Rocco code is not
necessarily an indictment of all of the concepts that appear in that code.
Some, for instance, may have amounted to important normative
developments that have escaped the gaze of theorists of blame attribution
in modern ICL.
In the case of the unitary theory in particular, the allegations from
illiberal authoritarianism are clearly specious. As a matter of history, the
concept’s origins pre and post-date WWII, as Getz, Torp, von Liszt and
72

EDGARDO ALBERTO DONNA, TEORIA DEL DELITO Y DE LA PENA 75 (2003) (arguing that
“due to the connection between the unitary theory and these ideas [Fascism and Nazism]
today nobody argues them. Because of its obvious danger and its incompatibility with the
Rule of Law.”); See also, MIGUEL DÍAZ Y GARCÍA CONLLEDO, ESTUDIOS DE FILOSOFÍA
DEL DERECHO PENAL 75 (2006) (criticizing the unitary theory for similar reasons).
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Giuliano Vassalli, The Background of Current Italian Penal Law Reform, in STUDIES
IN COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL LAW 51–64, 59 (Edward M. Wise & Gerhard O. W. Mueller
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the UIDP show. Substantively, the theory also holds comparative
advantages in the subjective realm—by maintaining parity in the mental
elements required for perpetrators and accomplices, the unitary theory
avoids “modes of liability” acting as a prism that distorts responsibility,
instead of assigning it in line with the culpability announced in the crime
(with which both perpetrator and accomplice will be convicted). A
doctrine like JCEIII has proved highly controversial in international
criminal law, precisely because it tolerates major cleavages between the
mental element announced in the mode of liability (foreseeability) and that
contained in many crimes with which the mode couples (genocide, for
instance, requires a specific purpose). By solving this problem in a
defendant’s favor, the unitary theory promotes greater liberalism,
vindicating the UIDP’s enthusiasm for what they perceived as a genuine
advance in criminal science. In short, Italian fascism is no blemish on the
unitary theory’s liberal credentials.
Consequently, if ICL is committed to liberal principles of blame
attribution, it might also choose to transcend the dilemmas it currently
faces through recourse (back) to the unitary theory of perpetration applied
at Nuremberg, or even better, towards a more self-conscious variant that is
crafted by academics in keeping with the origins of the unitary theory
nationally. After all, the Italian experience is instructive in at least one
important respect: it suggests that if left unchecked, the very thoughtful
disagreement that presently exits among leading judges and scholars about
the dividing line between perpetration and complicity in ICL may not
come to any widely-shared conclusion, or to say the same thing
differently, may continue in perpetuity without ever reaching consensus in
theory or practice. This prospect of disagreement ad infinitum should be
unsettling to criminal lawyers concerned about the right to a trial based on
pre-established, stable legal principles rather than a process that involves a
multiplicity of goal posts that are constantly in motion. At the very least, a
unitary theory like the one adopted in Italy in 1930 warrants far great
scholarly engagement as a plausible solution to debates that could well
turn out to be intractable.
V. AUTONOMOUS CHOICE IN BRAZIL
Until the year 1822, Brazil was a juridical dependency of Portugal.
In the year 1822, what we now know as Brazil proclaimed its
independence.77 The first Penal Code of Brazil was promulgated in 1830,
77

Celso Campilongo, History and Sources of Brazilian Law, in INTRODUCTION TO
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2016]

23

and for better or worse, it maintained the differentiated system of blame
attribution that was in place under the authority of its erstwhile colonial
masters, who had in turn borrowed it from the French Penal Code of 1810
and the Spanish Penal Code of 1822.78 The differentiated system of blame
attribution continued in the Brazilian Penal Code of 1890, but in 1940,
Brazilian legislators too would make the transition to a unitary theory of
perpetration on the strength of the UIDP’s influence and the example set
by pioneering European nations. Article 25 of the Brazilian Penal Code of
1940 states that “Whoever, in any way, concurs for the crime is under the
penalties attributed to it.” There is some debate as to the origins of the
provision—the received wisdom is that it was borrowed from the Italian
Rocco Code.79 Costa e Silva, however, argues that the Norwegian Penal
Code of 1902 inspired the position, since the Norwegian influence was
evident in Brazil within ordinances prior to that date.80 Whatever the
dominant source of inspiration, ICL can learn something significant from
the manner in which the unitary theory was adopted in Brazil—it was
openly elected not imposed.
To those familiar with debates about “modes of liability” in modern
ICL, the Brazilian refusal to differentiate between forms of attribution will
appear bizarre, uninformed, or fringe, but in fact the abundance of
differentiated systems of blame attribution throughout the many systems
of criminal law globally that informs these perceptions largely has forced
imposition through colonialism to thank. With the partial exception of
Italy, the European states that had adopted a unitary theory like that
employed at Nuremberg and Tokyo were never colonial powers. Hence,
when Brazil came to adopt the unitary theory of perpetration, it did so far
more willingly. England, France, Spain and Germany, by contrast, all
adopted the differentiated system now ascendant in ICL, then
disseminated this system to the four corners of the global as part of
European colonial rule. As I have argued elsewhere together with Asad
Kiyani, the implications for our appreciation of diversity in criminal
doctrine globally are appreciable—criminal doctrine is not a safe
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guarantor of a diversity in underlying social and cultural values.81 The
Brazilian relationship to the unitary theory is, however, an exception to
this trend, which ICL may wish to replicate for symbolic as well as
functional reasons.
The truth is that ICL frequently absorbs laws that are colonial
artifacts, including standards of blame attribution. In the Bagasora Trial
Judgment, for instance, an ICTR Trial Chamber cited to the Indian Penal
Code (IPC) of 1860 as the embodiment of Pakistani criminal law in a
survey of global criminal law.82 In fact, the British used the IPC as a
template for most all their colonial territories: it was implemented
verbatim in countries as diverse as Uganda, Singapore and Australia,
without calibration to local circumstances.83 Similarly, by decree dated
January 7th, 1886, the Belgian King Leopold promulgated the first Code
Pénal du Congo. The code involved “vocabulary, formulation, and
structure that was directly borrowed from Belgian criminal law
legislation”.84 Independence in 1960 just continued this trend,85 such that
the leading modern textbook on Congolese criminal law—authored by the
81
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Dean of the School of Law at the Université de Kinshasa—still draws a
direct line between the current criminal code and Belgian decrees of 20
January 1940 and 7 January 1886.86
To cite one final example from a national system that was not
formally colonized, the Japanese adopted German notions of
(differentiated) blame attribution at the turn of the 19th Century to ward
off full-blown colonial occupation.87 Gunboat diplomacy by Western
states compelled the Japanese to “elect” a European model of criminal
justice, such that they would do internally what colonialism would have
achieved otherwise.88 As Anthony Anghie has explained, the litmus test
for the type of international recognition that would forestall formal
colonial rule, known as standards of civilization, demanded that states like
Japan create “idealized European standards in both their external and,
more significantly, internal relations.”89 To comply with this exigency,
Japan initially adopted the French Napoleonic Penal Code (1880) and the
Code of Criminal Instruction (1880),90 but after only a very brief period in
effect, the French-based code came to be perceived as overly liberal, and
incapable of legitimating the structure and values of the imperial regime.91
In looking for European alternatives, the Japanese found German law
more advanced and German society more comparable.92 Consequently,
when one turns to Japanese modes of attribution now, they reveal a
86
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differentiated system quite alien to Anglo-American audiences, which
mirrors German criminal law and theory more or less precisely.93
Through all these processes, not the legislative autonomy apparent
in Brazil, the differentiated system of blame attribution became most
prevalent throughout the world. By the same dynamic, it also permeated
international law. Asad Kiyani and I have spent long hours plotting the
history of criminal law doctrine at each major interval in the development
of supranational ICL institutions.94 I will reiterate just one telling anecdote
here to show how modes of attribution at the international level are
infused with the same influences that propagated the differentiated model
throughout much of the world. As Kiyani and I show, in elevating Joint
Criminal Enterprise (“JCE”) into ICL, the Tadić decision cited a very
limited set of state practice from “England and Wales, Canada, the United
States, Australia and Zambia.”95 Regrettably, drawing on just Englishspeaking systems effectively double-counted the influence of law
generated through British colonialism: once in the metropole then several
times again within former colonies the parent system had constructed in
its own image.
Ironically, the same dangers are evident within judicial opposition to
aspects of JCE. A decision of the Extraordinary Criminal Chambers of
Cambodia (ECCC) rejecting one component of Tadić’s rendering of JCE
pointed to the absence of this aspect of the concept in Cambodian criminal
law.96 Yet, as authority for this more restrictive reading of JCE, the ECCC
cited a French text on the Cambodian Projet de Nouveau Code Pénal,
which explained Cambodian modes of attribution in terms that reflected
93
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French law par excellence.97 This parallelism was largely unsurprising
since French criminal law was introduced into Cambodia as early as 1929
as part of colonial control over “French Indochina,” and French law
remains the dominant legal influence in Cambodia to this day.98 The net
effect, given that this anecdote is in step with a global trend, is that the
existence and shape of international “modes of liability” is often a product
of (competing) colonial legacies rather than a volitional adoption of
criminal law standards among affected populations. Through these ignoble
processes, then, the differentiated system of blame attribution has gained
ascendancy globally.
By contrast, the Brazilian choice to adopt the unitary theory of
perpetration appears to epitomize a far greater degree of autonomy,
without the layers of coercion that are woven through the history of the
differentiated system.
VI. AVOIDING THE RECHARACTERIZATION PROBLEM IN AUSTRIA
In 1975, the Austrian legislature adopted a unitary theory of
perpetration too, chiefly due to the seminal work of Austrian criminal
theorist Diethelm Kienapfel.99 Like its forbearers elsewhere, the prior
Austrian Criminal Code of 1852 contained differentiated “modes of
liability.” At the same time, the earlier Austrian system adopted the
conceptually bizarre practice of assigning equal punishments to all
participants within the confines of a general part that differentiated
between different forms of participation, as is now the case in England,
France, and the ICC.100 The peculiarity, to draw again on George Fletcher,
is that this back-end equivalence arguably renders the front-end division
redundant.101 When the Austrian Commission of Criminal Law was
97
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established soon after WWII to rethink the earlier code, doing away with
this normative oddity was high among their priorities. Strangely, however,
the same oddity is retained in the ICC Statute—the ICC sets out a
differentiated system of blame attribution without formally requiring a
reduction in an accomplice’s sentence, and thus far, the ICC’s various
Chambers have opined that complicity need not warrant a reduction of any
sort.102
I seize, however, upon a different point of commonality between
modern ICL and Austria pre-unitary theory. One of the key factors in the
unitary theory’s favor, which carried great weight in the Austrian decision
to abandon “modes of liability” was that the new unitary theory precluded
the possibility of appealing against the stipulation of a “mode of liability”
if the classification changed late in a trial.103 Since all forms of
participation were substantively identical, there would be no prejudice to
the defendant if the form of perpetration was wrongly determined at the
outset.104 By chance, this coincides perfectly with the Regulation 55
conundrum the ICC now faces, which has caused a great deal of
consternation in judicial and extra-judicial writing. I pause, then, to
introduce the current dynamics of the Regulation 55 debate
internationally, showing once again how curiously, history sometimes
repeats.
Regulation 55 of the ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence provides
that a “Chamber may change the legal characterization of facts to accord
with the crimes […] or to accord with the form of participation of the
accused […] without exceeding the facts and circumstances described in
the charges and any amendments to the charges.”105 The rule has proved
controversial in practice, with respect to the ability to legally
recharacterize crimes as well as forms of participation. As regards the
former, an ICC Pre-Trial Chamber invoked Regulation 55 to
recharacterize an armed conflict in the DRC as international rather than
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non-international.106 The test’s larger controversies, however, have come
in cases involving the recharacterization of forms of participation,
sometimes well after in-court proceedings have come to a close,107 thereby
emulating the very problem Austrians sought to resolve through recourse
to a unitary theory of perpetration.
On 21 September 2012, after the prosecution case had closed and
the Court was over a month into the Defense case, an ICC Trial Chamber
gave notice pursuant to Regulation 55 that it could choose to modify the
legal characterization of the facts that had emerged in one-time DRC
Vice-President Jean-Pierre Bemba’s trial. Instead of requiring Bemba’s
“knowledge” of his subordinates’ crimes for the purposes of superior
responsibility, the Court intimated that “should have known” would
suffice.108 Then, far more controversially, six months after both the
prosecution and defense cases had ended, a Trial Chamber notified the
parties that it intended to consider Congolese warlord Germain Katanga’s
liability as an entirely lesser form of participation, not co-perpetration as
he was charged with.109 One of the judges in the case rebuked the decision
severely in dissent, arguing that it went “well beyond any reasonable
application of the provision and fundamentally encroaches upon the
accused’s right to a fair trial.”110 With one notable exception, academic
studies of the topic have mirrored the judicial disquiet,111 but few have
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recognized that some jurisdictions have resolved the larger part of the
problem structurally.
For instance, in an excellent article criticizing the recharacterization
of modes of participation at the ICC, Kevin Jon Heller opines that
Regulation 55’s shortcomings are manifest: “the defence will now have to
rebut each and every possible form of complicity during trial, because it
cannot be sure which one(s) the Trial Chamber will ultimately deem to be
the proper legal characterization of the facts.”112 Notice, however, that this
problem mostly recedes into obscurity once standards of responsibility are
condensed into a single form. In other words, the factor that makes
recharacterization simultaneously desirable and problematic for forms of
participation is that it is possible to talk about “each and every possible
form of complicity” (or perpetration) at all. If this troublesome doctrinal
pluralism is acknowledged and withdrawn, modes of participation would
not have different substantive contours. As such, the parties would be left
to contest whether the accused made a substantial causal contribution to a
crime with the requisite mental element announced in it, and most
significantly, these elements could never shift. As the Austrians foresaw,
the need to recharacterize forms of participation at least would be almost
entirely obviated.
Once again, the UIDP played a vital role in paving the way for
Austria to escape these types of problems, even though the doctrinal shift
from differentiated to unitary took place over seventy years after the
UIDP’s famous endorsement of the theory. Interestingly, the Austrian
legal change of heart seemed less a stubborn insistence on autonomy from
the highly influential German neighbor, and more the product of a
sustained philosophical commitment over that long duration. While
German criminal theory engulfed systems of criminal justice that were far
more distant in language, geography and culture (like Japan and now the
International Criminal Court), Austrian academics kept the unitary theory
alive through continual debate. One leading Austrian commentator
concludes that “it was their constant publications on unitary perpetration
theories that reached the result that (German) ideas of accessory
participation (i.e. derivative perpetration of accomplices) could never
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really become domestic in Austria.”113 In my humble view, they should
not have become international either. Nonetheless, that international
courts and tribunals have adopted a differentiated system does not mean
ICL has crossed the Rubicon; each of the national systems I discuss here
replaced differentiated systems of blame attribution with unitary
alternatives, even when the former appeared to be firmly entrenched
within the respective legal cultures.
VII. CONCLUSION
For someone familiar with modes of participation in contemporary
ICL, reading the history of the unitary theory of perpetration will probably
produce a strange sense of déjà vu. So many of the problems that bedevil
this aspect of modern ICL were confronted and overcome when a set of
European nations followed the advice of the UIDP, then the largest
international congregation of criminal law theorists globally, by
dismantling their differentiated system of blame attribution in favor of a
unitary alternative. In this article, I have sought to pay homage to
Professor Mirjan Damaška’s catalytic effect on my professional life and
scholarly agenda by again suggesting that ICL should undertake a similar
turn, such that responsibility for international crimes would mean
something clear, stable, and conceptually defensible throughout the many
jurisdictions capable of trying these offenses. There is, no doubt, much
critical scholarly work still to be done to test the buoyancy of this vessel,
but as I hope the foregoing has shown, our understandable affinity for the
differentiated model presently in force is mostly a byproduct of our
socialization in systems of criminal law from powerful Western states. If I
have exceeded myself, this piece will have challenged these sorts of
received wisdoms for others half as well as Damaška’s masterpiece once
did for me.
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